Abstract. In multi-prover interactive proofs, the verifier interrogates the provers and attempts to steal their knowledge. Other than that, the verifier's role has not been studied. Augmentation of the provers with non-local resources results in classes of languages that may not be NEXP. We have discovered that the verifier plays a much more important role than previously thought. Simply put, the verifier has the capability of providing non-local resources for the provers intrinsically. Therefore, standard MIPs may already contain protocols equivalent to one in which the prover is augmented non-locally. Existing MIPs' proofs of soundness implicitly depend on the fact that the verifier is not a nonlocal resource provider. The verifier's non-locality is a new unused tool and liability for protocol design and analysis. Great care should have been taken when claiming that ZKMIP = MIP and MIP = NEXP. For the former case, we show specific issues with existing protocols and revisit the proof of this statement. For the latter case, we exhibit doubts that we do not fully resolve. To do this, we define a new model of multiprover interactive proofs which we call "correlational confinement form" (CCF-MIP).
Introduction
An interactive proof is a dialog between two parties: a polynomial-time verifier and an all-powerful prover [1, 2] . They agree ahead of time on some language L and a string x. The prover tries to convince the verifier that x ∈ L. If this is true, the prover should succeed almost all the time; if not, the prover should fail almost all the time. This is a generalization of the complexity class NP, except instead of simply being handed a polynomial-sized witness, you are allowed to quiz the hand that is feeding you. The set of languages that admit an interactive proof is called IP.
An interactive proof is zero-knowledge if the verifier learns nothing except the truth of "x ∈ L". This is usually defined by saying that a distinguisher is unable to tell apart a real conversation between the prover and the verifier and one which is generated by a lone polynomial-time simulator. The set of zero-knowledge interactive proofs [1] is called ZKIP. One of the most important results regarding interactive proofs is that IP = ZKIP = PSPACE, which follows from seminal works of [3] and [4] . However, the only known way to achieve the ZKIP = PSPACE equality is to use some kind of commitment scheme which, in the single-prover model, is dependent on complexity assumptions.
The multi-prover model was introduced in [5] . This model consists of multiple, non-communicating provers talking solely to a single verifier. The inspiration for this model was that of a detective interrogating a bunch of suspects, each of whom is isolated in a separate room. The suspects may share a strategy before being separated, but once the interrogation begins they are no longer able to talk to one another. The main motivation for studying this model was to remove the complexity assumptions used in the commitment schemes. We will abbreviate "multi-prover interactive proof" as MIP, and the set of languages which can be accepted by MIPs as the boldface MIP.
An important consequence of having multiple provers is that the verifier can use one prover to check the consistency of other provers' answers. This gives the (weak) verifier more power over the (all-powerful) provers. Consequently, through the works of [5, 6, 7] , it was shown that MIP = ZKMIP = NEXP. That is, any language in NEXP can be accepted by a MIP (optionally by a zero-knowledge MIP).
Our paper takes us all the way back to the foundations of MIP. We have identified a blind spot in what we call the "standard" MIP model (one verifier talking to a bunch of provers) that is not addressed in existing literature. As a lead-up to describing this blind spot, we invite the readers to consider the following ridiculous two-prover protocol:
Protocol 1. ( Ridiculous Protocol )
1. Verifier sends Prover 1 a random string S. 2. Prover 1 replies with a string T . 3. Verifier sends Prover 2 the string T . 4. Prover 2 replies with a string S .
Verifier accepts if S = S .
Suppose that we claim the following ridiculous theorem: Theorem 2. (Ridiculous Theorem) The probability that the verifier accepts in the Ridiculous Protocol is exponentially small.
Proof. By the definition of MIPs, the provers cannot communicate. If Prover 1 can output an S that is the same as the uniformly random S that only Prover 2 knows, then they must have communicated. Contradiction.
The reader is astute in pointing out that steps 2 and 3 of the Ridiculous Protocol clearly show that the verifier is helping the provers by relaying the very answer it is supposed to keep secret. The proof of the Ridiculous Theorem overlooked the blind spot that is the verifier's interactions. This is our point, exaggerated.
The blind spot we have discovered in the standard MIP model is what we shall call "correlational contamination" by the verifier. Put simply, a verifier talking to one prover and then talking to another prover risks unwittingly bridge the provers in some non-local capacity. At worst, this bridge could outright allow the provers to talk. If a MIP assumes that the provers are correlated in some way (i.e., local), then the verifier could undesirably change that correlation.
In existing MIP literature, the proofs of soundness do not account for this blind spot. It is easy to see the above verifier as clearly non-local (steps 2 and 3 signals for the provers). It is not so easy when the verifier is more complex. It is an even subtler point when we consider that the verifier could be helping the provers in a no-signaling, yet non-local manner. We believe that proofs within the standard model must be reconsidered in light of this discovery. We will further discuss this last point in Sections 2 and 7.
To clarify, we are not saying that any existing MIP protocol is unsound, only that their proofs of soundness all missed this blind spot, and therefore one could have drawn incorrect conclusions from those protocols. The standard MIP model cannot avoid the fundamental problem of correlational contamination. We believe that this blind spot is critical to the foundations of multi-prover interaction, and we wish to draw the community's attention to this issue and offer our solution -a multi-prover, multi-verifier model (Section 3). This is not a replacement of the single-verifier model, but rather a generalization of it. Studying this more general model has given us insight about the standard MIP model.
Our model is what we shall call the correlational confinement form of multiprover interactive proofs. MIPs in this form have prover-verifier pairs who are talking, but no communication between any of the pairs. At the end of a correlational confinement form protocol, the verifiers get together and decide to accept or reject, at which point they no longer interact with the provers. This new model offers the following advantages:
1. If desired, the provers and verifiers are guaranteed to be local. 2. The non-local resources of provers and verifiers are made explicit. 3. It is easy to describe the provers' and verifiers' non-local resources in a much more fine-grained manner, rather than just "entangled" or "no-signaling." 4. It is possible to enforce "honest non-locality" on the provers by having the verifier provide them with non-local resources. Our model makes this explicit. 5. A new property of zero-knowledge emerges naturally as a result.
Our Contributions
In this work:
-We summarize issues with the standard (single-verifier) MIP model (Section 2). -We describe our solution, a new model of multi-verifier MIP which we call "correlational confinement form" (CCF-MIP) and justify its definition by expanding on its advantages over the standard model. We argue that a special case of CCF-MIPs, one in which all provers and verifiers are local, is what the standard, single-verifier MIPs implicitly assumes. We make these assumptions explicit and show that there is a local-verifier, local-prover CCF-MIP which accepts oracle-3-SAT (Section 3). -We describe a protocol which is local-verifier, local-prover and zero-knowledge which accepts oracle-3-SAT, achieving zero-knowledge without needing the provers to authenticate any messages, and prove its security (Section 4). -We show that, in the CCF-MIP model, a new property of zero-knowledge naturally emerges that is a distinct stronger flavor of zero-knowledge (Section 5). -We explore an advantage of our new model: the improved granularity by which we can define non-local correlations between the provers (and also between the verifiers), and begin to explore augmenting provers with finegrained non-locality (Section 6). -Finally, we explore another advantage of our new model: how to let the verifiers augment the provers with non-locality which malicious provers cannot exploit arbitrarily (we call it enforceably honest non-locality). We tentatively suggest that, since this new tool has yet to be studied by the research community, and may affect the set of languages accepted by standard MIPs, NEXP = MIP may not be fully settled (Section 7).
The Standard MIP Model
When [5] introduced multi-prover interactive proofs, it was formalized as follows:
. . , P k be computationally unbounded Turing machines and let V be a probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machine. All machines have a read-only input tape, a private work tape and a random tape. The P i 's share a joint, infinitely long, read-only random tape. Each P i has a write-only communication tape to V , and vice-versa. We call (P 1 , . . . , P k , V ) a k-prover interactive protocol.
Since then, there have been augmentations of the model by giving the provers various non-local resources, such as entanglement [8] , or CHSH boxes [9, 10] . There also have been works studying the security of non-local-resistant protocols [11, 10] , . However, the verifier remained constant throughout the literature.
The first work to point out a problem with the standard MIP model (our aforementioned blind spot), although it was not worded this explicitly, was [10] .
In order to understand their point, we need to understand the following twoprover protocols.
Protocol 3. ( BGKW-type commitment protocol to b ) P 1 and P 2 pre-share a random n-bit string w.
1. V sends a random n-bit strings r to P 2 . 2. P 2 replies with x ← b × r ⊕ w.
This is a two-prover commitment protocol. Steps 1 and 2 commit, while steps 3 and 4 open. An intuitive proof of its binding condition is that, since the provers cannot signal, and they both need to know r in order to open the commitment in the way they want, therefore they cannot cheat. This intuition is incomplete, as was pointed out in [10] , because breaking the binding condition does not require signaling. The following protocol, known as a CHSH-box, can be used to break binding without signaling. By having P 1 , P 2 obtain w , x via the CHSH-box, P 1 can open the commitment the way it wishes, c. This fact will become extremely important in Sections 4 and 5.
The punchline of [10] is that the verifier itself can execute a CHSH-box for the provers without violating their no-signaling assumption. This is not even the worst part. It is perhaps acceptable to look at protocol 3 and say that it is clearly not a CHSH-box, but consider the following:
1. Any security proof of protocol 3 must show that it does not contain a CHSHbox as a subroutine. 2. More generally, any security proof of a protocol must show that no subroutine within itself can be commandeered by the provers to achieve a non-local functionally (like the CHSH-box). 3. Composition of protocols, for instance between the committing and the opening of commitments, must be done in such a way that provably does not create a non-local box.
The solution proposed in [10] was that of verifier isolation. Practically speaking, this means that any message an "isolating" verifier sends to a set S of provers must be computed solely from messages that are received from S. The end result is that an isolating verifier can never accidentally implement a CHSH-box and, in general, it will always enforce the locality of the provers. In a sense, we can think of an isolating verifier as "local"; a non-isolating verifier can be thought of as "non-local". We will make this precise in the next section.
Let us look at another problem which inspired us to pose the question of verifier non-locality. Existing zero-knowledge MIP protocols such as [12] require that the verifier courier an authenticated message between the provers in order to obtain soundness while ensuring zero-knowledge. The gist of it goes like this:
1. V asks P 1 a bunch of questions. 2. V wants to check one of P 1 's answers with P 2 for consistency. 3. In order for zero-knowledge to hold, V must ask P 2 a question it has already asked P 1 . 4. P 1 authenticates a question with a key that was committed at the beginning of the protocol and sends it to V . 5. V sends the question and the authentication to P 2 , who proceeds only if authentication succeeds.
Steps 4 and 5 consists of V sending a message from P 1 to P 2 . It was not shown that this act cannot be used to signal. Moreover, as we have discussed above, it is not necessary to signal in order to break commitments, and therefore soundness. We do not know whether it is possible for the provers to actually succeed in commandeering the verifier in order to execute a non-local task; however, this needs to be proven, and the proof contained in [12] does not address this issue. Moreover, the zero-knowledge protocol of [12] allows P 1 to send an arbitrary message to P 2 (via the authentication key). Therefore one cannot even compose such a protocol in a nested fashion (as a subroutine call) since the inner instance would violate the assumption of the outer instance that no communication has occurred after commitment and before opening.
We quickly mention that existing simulators for a protocol such as those found in [12] needs to know how to break commitments in order to simulate. The simulator accomplishes this by acting as both provers, thereby receiving the secret strings r 0 and r 1 which are meant for one prover only. This standard model of zero-knowledge gives the simulator unnecessary power, in a sense. We will discuss this further in section 5. For more details on the problems of the standard MIP model, see [13] .
Correlational Contamination as a Tool
There is a flip side to the fact that the verifier is capable of performing nonlocal tasks for the provers. In general, when provers become more correlated, for example through entanglement or other no-signaling distributions, it is not always clear whether the classes of languages accepted in these augmented models should shrink or expand (or change in other ways). This is because the increased correlations give both honest and dishonest provers more power, and the sum of their expanded capabilities could go either way.
With this in mind, recall that it was claimed that MIP = NEXP [6, 7] . When provers are augmented with quantum entanglement a priori, this is a potentially different class of languages which is denoted by MIP * . At the time of this writing, we only know that MIP * ⊇ NEXP [8] . Equality has not been established. It is possible that there exists some language L ∈ MIP * such that L ∈ NEXP. If this turns out to be the case, and that in a MIP for L, the quantum processing used by the provers can be simulated within classical polynomial-time, then we can ask a classical verifier to simulate entanglement for classical provers in the protocol itself, and the provers would not need to be quantum. This would falsify the result that MIP = NEXP. We have one of two possibilities:
1. The existing proof [6] that MIP ⊆ NEXP overlooked the cases where V provides extra non-local resources to the provers. 2. All languages accepted by MIPs where P 's are local with arbitrary extra nonlocal resources (in polynomial amount) are contained in NEXP 3 (bringing no extra power at all).
If the first case turns out to be true, then the overall power of MIPs would increase. Otherwise, the second case being true would imply that we would only need to consider MIPs where the verifiers are also confined to local; this would simplify soundness proofs considerably. We do not know which of the two possibilities is correct, but they both seem worthy of further investigation.
We will discuss the idea of using the verifier to form enforceable and honest non-locality for the provers in section 7.
Correlational Confinement Form MIP
As discussed above, the standard MIP model of a single verifier talking to multiple provers could make the verifier a non-local bridge between the provers. If a protocol does not desire this -and all existing MIPs do not -it must be proven impossible.
We neutralize this problem by defining a model with multiple verifiers, each of which talks to a single prover; in turn, each prover talks to a single verifier. There are no communication tapes between the verifiers. There is a special verifier V 0 which only reads the outputs of the other verifiers; this is the verifier that will decide to accept or reject. We call this model "correlation-confined" since the provers and verifiers are explicitly local, and all of their non-local correlations (if any) are delegated to two machines called P and V .
This model is a generalization of the standard model because the special setting where P is empty and V signals for the verifiers corresponds to the standard MIP model. In this section, we focus on a specific sub-case of the standard model where both P and V are empty, which we call "local." But first, let us define our model in full.
Definition 2. Let ( V , V 0 , V 1 , . . . , V k , P , P 1 , . . . , P k ) be a tuple of interactive Turing machines, where the P's are computationally all-powerful and the V's are polynomial-time. Every machine has a read-only input tape, a local work tape, and a random tape initialized uniformly at random. For each i, there are two-way communication tapes between V i and P i , and that for all j, there is a two-way communication tape between V and V j and also between P and P j . In addition, for each , there is a read-only tape going from V to V 0 (where V 0 reads). Then, this is said to be a multi-prover interactive proof in correlational confinement form (CCF-MIP).
It is perhaps easier to understand our definition with the help of figure 2.
. . .
The solid lines are two-way communication tapes and the dotted arrows are read-only tapes, with the arrow indicating the direction of information flow. We call V and P "non-local tasks". They will be used to generalize the model by explicitly giving the provers and verifiers non-local resources. For now, we are concerned only with what it means for the provers and verifiers to be local.
Definition 3.
A CCF-MIP is local if V = P = ∅ and all of the provers' (resp. verifiers) random tapes are initialized with an identical uniform random string.
It is accepted that isolated parties sharing (classical) randomness is considered local, hence our need for identical random tapes in the above definition.
We can define that a CCF-MIP accepts a language L if the usual soundness and completeness conditions hold:
where t i is the read-only tape from V i to V 0 at the end of the interaction of V i with P i (or P i ) on input x.
Note that we do not quantify over P (nor V ), as soundness would be impossible for all languages outside PSPACE since one possible P is simply a signaling task for the provers. We want to use P and V not as (possibly malicious) participants to the protocol, but as a description of non-local resources available to the provers and verifiers.
With CCF-MIPs, the special verifier V 0 decides to accept or reject. This verifier cannot communicate with anyone else, avoiding the aforementioned correlational contamination. This is in contrast with standard, single-verifier MIPs where the verifier talks to all the provers and then decides to accept or not.
Local-prover CCF-MIPs form a subclass of standard MIPs. They are, by design, more restricted in what you can make the verifier do. An immediate question is whether this is too restrictive. Perhaps, in all interesting cases, it is necessary for a single verifier to go back-and-fourth between provers, using previous discussions to generate new questions.
The answer is that, surprisingly, of all the literature we have surveyed, almost all protocols can be re-written in such a way that the single verifier is "split" in our sense without any loss of functionality. We have explicitly demonstrated this in [15] for the multi-prover protocol for oracle-3-SAT in [7] . We briefly discuss how below.
The protocol details can be found in [7] , section 3. For our purposes, we only need the form of the protocol, which is as follows:
1. V asks P 1 some questions non-adaptively. 2. V chooses a question Q from the pool of questions which was asked to P 1 . 3. V asks Q to P 2 . 4. V accepts if the interaction with P 1 was successful, and the answer from P 2 is consistent with those of P 1 .
The crucial observation is that V does not adaptively ask questions to P 1 . Therefore, the questions asked on that entire side of the conversation might as well have been selected in advance; and if they can be selected in advance, they can be shared in advance with a second verifier. We can therefore naturally rewrite the [7] protocol as a local CCF-MIP in the following way. We ask that the reader fills in the details from [7] , section 3. 1. V 1 prepares the questions which it will ask P 1 . 2. V 1 chooses a question Q from the above list and shares it with V 2 . 3. CCF-MIP begins. All parties are confined as per definitions. 4. V 1 asks the questions to P 1 . 5. V 2 asks Q to P 2 . 6. V 0 , reading the responses, decides to accept or reject, based on the same criteria as in protocol 4.
The [7] protocol is for oracle-3-SAT, which is NEXP-complete. Thus we can conclusively say that NEXP ⊆ MIP, at least. Why inclusion and not equality? We have partially discussed that in section 2.1, and we will discuss it further in section 7.
The non-trivial question is whether there exists a local zero-knowledge CCF-MIP for NEXP. The existing technique for achieving zero-knowledge in MIP [5, 12] requires the (single) verifier to courier an authenticated message between provers. This is not possible with local CCF-MIPs. In the next section, we show that there is a way around that constraint.
A Local ZKMIP in Correlational Confinement Form for NEXP
We describe here a CCF-MIP with the following properties (in addition to completeness and soundness):
-Local, as defined in the previous section.
-Zero-knowledge, in the traditional sense as well as an expanded sense discussed in the next section.
As discussed above, the oracle-3-SAT protocol from [7] is local in the sense that the interaction with P 2 involves only a single question, sampled from the pool of questions the verifier has asked P 1 . This can be "localized" by a pair of verifiers by asking them to share a random tape before the protocol begins.
The existing, generic way of turning an interactive proof into a zero-knowledge one is by running it in committed form. That is, instead of answering a question directly, P 1 commits his answers, then at the end convinces V that the answers are correct. V then asks P 2 a question, and receives a committed answer. The provers would then show that the answers are equal, without opening the commitments. The problem is that during the P 2 phase, the verifier must ask a question that it has asked P 1 in order to ensure zero-knowledge. This is addressed in [5] and [12] by asking the first prover to compute the verifier's question in committed form, add a message authentication tag using a secret key that the provers shared, and finally asks the verifier to send the message to P 2 , who then checks whether the authentication is valid before executing its part of the protocol. This type of protocol cannot be made into local, correlational confinement form, since the verifiers of a CCF-MIP cannot talk to each other.
We present a local zero-knowledge CCF-MIP which addresses this problem. Our solution basically asks the provers to encrypt an answer with a key that is based on the verifier's question. That is, we force V 2 to behave honestly (to ask a question that V 1 has asked), without having the provers to sign off on the question, by saying, "If the verifiers ask the provers the same question, they will receive the same random string. Otherwise, they will receive two unrelated random strings." Since these questions can be chosen by the verifiers in advance, there is no need for the provers to authenticate the questions before answering, nor for the verifier to courier said question between provers.
The rest of the protocol consists of P 1 and V 1 evaluating the verifier's circuit from the "BFL classic" protocol from section 3 of [7] , which we call Λ, in committed form. We refer the reader to that reference for the detailed description of their protocol.
The gist of our local zero-knowledge CCF-MIP (protocol 7) is the prover saying to the verifier, "You filled in the randomness for the BFL verifier, and I filled in the answers. If I were to open the commitments, you would see that the BFL verifier would accept."
To begin, we will first need the CHSH commitment (protocol 6), which is secure in the local setting as previously proved in [16] .
The Protocols
The following is a CHSH-type commitment that is perfectly concealing and statistically binding. In general, we use the commitment-box notation " b " as the name of a commitment to bit b in the next two protocols. Protocol 6. A statistically binding, perfectly concealing commitment protocol.
All parties agree on a security parameter 1 k . P 1 and P 2 partition their private random tape into two k-bit strings w 1 , w 2 .
Pre-computation phase:
-V 1 samples two k-bit strings z 1 , z 2 independently and uniformly, and provides them to V 2 . -V 1 sends z 1 to P 1 and V 2 sends z 2 to P 2 . Commit phase:
Opening phase:
-P 1 sends w 1 , w 2 to V 1 .
and accepts b otherwise.
Below is the local zero-knowledge CCF-MIP for oracle-3-SAT, Protocol 7. The basis of Protocol 7 is the (non-zero-knowledge) MIP for oracle-3-SAT found in [7] , the notations of which we borrowed 4 . Following it we will give a proof sketch of its completeness, soundness, zero-knowledge and locality.
Protocol 7. A local zero-knowledge CCF-MIP for oracle-3-SAT
Let x, an instance of oracle-3-SAT, be the common input, let |x| = k, and let Λ be the verifier's program in the BFL classic protocol [7] .
1. Pre-computation: (a) All parties agree on a family of strongly-universal-2 hash functions {H i } indexed by k-bit keys. (b) V 1 samples two k-bit strings z 1 , z 2 independently and uniformly, and provides them to V 2 . (c) V 1 selects k random K-bit strings r 1 , ..., r k and evaluates the circuit of Λ on input r i , resulting in questions Q 1 , ..., Q k , and provides them to V 2 (d) V 1 randomly chooses i, 1 ≤ i ≤ k + 3, the index of an oracle query that will be made to both P 1 and P 2 . V 1 provides i to V 2 . (e) V 1 sends z 1 to P 1 and V 2 sends z 2 to P 2 . (f) P 1 and P 2 agree on a k-bit string γ. -Let g(z, Q k+1 , Q k+2 , Q k+3 , A(Q k+1 ), A(Q k+2 ), A(Q k+3 )) be the arithmetization obtained by section 3.2 of [7] , let z be a string of length r and Q k+1 , Q k+2 , Q k+3 be strings of length s, as appropriate. V 1 and P 1 execute the protocol of section 3.3 of [7] in committed form, using coins selected by P 1 whenever randomness is required. At the end of this phase, P 1 shows that the committed final value is equal to
an evaluation in committed form of g using the committed random bits that were used during the protocol's loop. If this fails,
(c) P 1 proves to V 1 that Ω 1 was computed correctly, from the existing commitments. -Ω 1 = Ω 2 -All commitments which have been opened are valid.
-V 1 did not reject in the two previous cases
Proof Sketches of Security Locality
In both the commitment protocol (protocol 6) and the CCF-MIP (protocol 7), the provers do not interact with each other, making them trivially local as per definition 3; V 0 does not interact with the remaining verifiers once the protocol begins; V 1 and V 2 do not interact with the provers once the protocol ends; therefore, since neither the provers nor the verifiers share any additional resources, the verifiers are local.
Completeness
Completeness follows from the completeness of the underlying protocol [7] , and the fact that the commitment protocol (protocol 6) is well-defined for honest provers (who will never send a commitment that they cannot open).
Soundness
The scaffolding for our soundness proof will be the following. Suppose that there is a trusted third party handling commitments that are perfectly binding, and that this third party sends the receiver a unique identifying receipt for every commitment. If we were to use this commitment to execute a protocol in committed form (as we do in protocol 7), then to each committed transcript of an execution there would be a unique real transcript (of the BFL protocol in our case). In this case, a committed transcript shows that it ends in accept if and only if the associated real transcript, which one would obtain by running the base protocol, also ends in accept. Thus, if the base protocol has a soundness error of, say, 1/3, then so does this committed version.
We can remove the scaffolding by replacing the trusted third-party with protocol 6. This does not change the argument, except with exponentially small change to the soundness error. To begin with, local probabilistic provers are equivalent to local deterministic provers. This is because the success probability α of randomized provers is an average over the randomized provers' random tapes. Each instance of a random tape represents a deterministic strategy. Therefore there is a deterministic strategy which succeeds with probability at least α. Therefore, we only need to consider local deterministic provers.
Let us analyze our commitment protocol. Since P 1 is deterministic, we may unambiguously consider what happens if we were to "rewind" it. Suppose that at some point P 1 opens a particular commitment c to 0, and that by rewinding P 1 and have V 1 make different choices, P 1 then opens the same commitment c to 1 (an attempt to break binding). Because of locality, P 1 's behavior is independent of what P 2 receives (namely z 2 ). Therefore, there is only one such z 2 which V 0 will ultimately accept as a valid opening of c in both ways (recall that our commitment is statistically binding).
In the worst case, for every commitment there exists a sequence of interaction between V 1 and P 1 such that P 1 will attempt to break the binding of that commitment. Each such commitment-breaking corresponds to at most one string z 2 that will actually work.
Let us denote the set of such binding-breaking strings by B. If z 2 / ∈ B, then the provers will not break binding, and the soundness error is reduced to that of the underlying protocol (at most 1/3). On the other hand, since |B| < poly(k), the probability that z 2 ∈ B is at most poly(k)/2 k . Therefore, the soundness error of our protocol is at most P r[z 2 / ∈ B and underlying protocol accepts] + P r[
Zero-Knowledge
Our use of the multi-verifier setup as a guarantee of locality leads us to an unforeseen problem. The participants of our protocol are two pairs of proververifiers and a "decision" verifier. In attempting to prove zero-knowledge in this new picture of MIPs, we must rethink about the purpose of the (sole) simulator. Before we do that, however, let us describe how to simulate in the standard case of a single simulator.
The simulation will be divided in two parts. In the first part, the simulator produces a transcript of the pre-computation, multilinearity test and sumcheck with oracle parts, which involves only interactions with V 1 . In the second part, the simulator will fake a valid consistency test.
We begin with the simple observation that if the provers can signal, then they can break the commitment of protocol 6. This is the basis of our simulation strategy, because if the provers can break the binding condition of commitments, then it does not matter what was actually committed. Put another way, if the simulator knows everything that both verifiers tell their respective provers, then the simulator can satisfy any cut-and-choose challenge by V 1 and convince it of anything, even though the simulator would have been committing random answers.
Since the simulator speaks to both verifiers, it does indeed know how to break binding. Therefore it can behave as if it were an honest P 1 , except the simulator's answers are commitments of independent and uniformly random strings. The simulator then breaks binding whenever V 1 challenges it to open a commitment. This is the simulator's strategy for everything except the consistency check question.
For the consistency check question, which we had denoted as Q i , the behavior of the simulator should be:
-The simulator computes Ω 1 honestly, from the random gibberish it has committed. -If the verifiers are honest, then Q i = Q i and the simulator outputs Ω 1 = Ω 2 .
-Otherwise, the simulator outputs Ω 1 and an independent and uniformly random Ω 2 .
But since the simulator knows which question was chosen (Q i ) and which was sent to the second prover (Q i ), it can behave as expected.
The hiding strength of our commitment is perfect, therefore the transcripts for V 1 and V 2 are identically distributed to real transcripts. The simulator sends them to V 0 for acceptance or rejection (remember that V 0 can behave arbitrarily). This is how zero-knowledge is handled in the standard MIP model. In the CCF-MIP model, a new, natural property of zero-knowledge emerges. Namely, if there are multiple provers and verifiers which are correlation-confined (whether they are local or not), should there not also be multiple simulators?
For protocol 7, it turns out that having a single simulator is unnecessary. It is possible to produce the same transcript with multiple, confined simulators, each interacting with a verifier. The trick is that they might need to be less confined than the verifiers -that is, they may need more non-local resources. We will discuss this in the next section.
Zero-Knowledge with Simulators of Minimal Correlation
For single-prover interactive proofs and standard MIPs, we typically discuss the "flavor" of zero-knowledge. Broadly speaking, there are computational, statistical and perfect zero-knowledge interactive proofs, corresponding to an increasing indistinguishability of the simulated transcript. For almost all known languages, the flavor of an interactive proof's zeroknowledge corresponds to the hiding property of the commitment used. A detailed discussion about this can be found in [20] .
If we directly adapt the existing definition of zero-knowledge for CCF-MIPs, we end up with something like, "For every set S of local verifiers, there exists a simulator M such that M can output a transcript indistinguishable from that of S interacting with real provers." As mentioned in protocol 7's proof of zeroknowledge, by giving the simulator the ability to converse with both verifiers, it is trivial to break the binding condition of the commitment scheme. The simulator can satisfy every cut-and-choose challenge issued by the verifiers. Therefore it is easy to simulate a real conversation since the simulator can convince the verifiers of anything.
By moving to a multi-verifier model, we were able to make the non-local resources of the provers and verifiers explicit. For protocol 7, no one involved has any non-local resources; specifically, the verifiers do not. It stands to reason that there should be as many simulators as verifiers, and that the simulators should have as little additional non-local resources as possible (ideally, it would have the same as those of the verifiers). This leads to the following definition:
. . , M k ) be a tuple of polynomial-time interactive Turing machines. Each machine has a random tape, and every random tape is initialized with the same random bits. For 1 ≤ i ≤ k, there is a two-way communication tape between M and M i . There are no communication tapes between any of the M i 's. Then this is called a set of correlation-confined simulators and M is the confinement class of M.
such that the transcripts of conversations between
are identically distributed, where ( M , M 1 , . . . , M k ) is a set of correlation-confined simulators, then we say that T is a perfectly indistinguishable, M -confined zeroknowledge CCF-MIP.
To summarize, the zero-knowledge of CCF-MIPs has two attributes:
-Strength of indistinguishability: how indistinguishable is the simulated transcript from a real one. -Simulator's confinement class: how much extra non-local resources do the simulators need to produce the transcript.
The single-simulator zero-knowledge of standard model MIPs is equivalent to a signaling set of simulators; that is, those whose M is a signaling box. This is what protocol 7's proof of zero-knowledge actually described. However, we can do better.
Recall that the single simulator had two parts, the first part consists of passing V 1 's challenges, and the second consists of passing the consistency test. We will begin by describing the first part (pre-computation, multilinearity test and sumcheck with oracle) for multiple simulators. Given two arbitrary verifiers V 1 and V 2 : The gist of the first part of the simulation is simple. CHSH boxes can break the commitment scheme used in protocol 7 without giving the parties the ability to signal. Make M compute CHSH boxes for the simulators, who then have the ability to break commitments without signaling. The rest of part one of the simulation is exactly as in the single-simulator case.
The second part (the consistency test) can be done by having the simulators ignore the question:
( Perfectly Indistinguishable, CHSH-Confined Simulator for Protocol 7, Part 2)
By the properties of the strongly-universal-2 hash H, if Q i = Q i then Ω 1 = Ω 2 . Otherwise Ω 1 = Ω 2 with exponentially high probability. This produces the result as desired. The simulators then feed the transcripts to V 0 , and terminates simulation.
We close this section with two open questions. First, although protocol 7 is a local CCF-MIP, the only known ways of simulating the transcript are to give the simulators some kind of non-local resource such as a CHSH box (or a fully signaling box, but that is not necessary). We do not know whether it is possible to simulate protocol 7 with local simulators, but we are unable to show this to be impossible.
Second, the simulators' confinement class is not unique. We can modify the behavior of a CHSH box (by adding useless steps, for example) without reducing its non-localness. Therefore, it is not clear whether we can speak of a "maximal" confinement class for a given CCF-MIP. We have only shown, in our case, that the simulators can be relatively more confined (less non-locally correlated) than it was believed.
6 Non-Local Resources via P The M -confined simulators of the previous section hint at how we would like to utilize our correlational confinement form MIPs in general. In existing literature, non-local resources of provers are typically given as entanglement (for quantum provers) [9] , a no-signaling probability distribution from which the provers can sample [10] , or arbitrary no-signaling resources [21] . There is a lack of granularity to them. This is where P , what we call a non-local task, comes in. P , being a Turing machine, can be defined operationally. It is much more flexible than just letting provers sample from some distribution. First, a couple of definitions:
. . , V k , P , P 1 , . . . , P k ) be a CCF-MIP. Then T has V -confined verifiers and P -confined provers. We call T a ( V , P )-confined MIP.
In this section, we will focus on what we can do with P and not V . We begin with the observation that when the provers' non-local resources change, it changes as a tool (for honest provers) and as a liability (for dishonest provers), and it is not always clear how the resulting accepted class of languages should change as a result.
For example, with local verifier/provers, we have MIP = NEXP. Increase the provers' non-local resources to arbitrary entanglement (MIP * ), and we get MIP * ⊇ NEXP [8] , a possible increase of accepted languages. Increase the provers' non-local resources again to arbitrary no-signaling distributions (MIP ns ), however, and we end up with MIP ns = EXP [21] , a possible decrease of accepted languages (EXP vs. NEXP being open at the time of this writing).
The behavior of P can be more complex than those correlations studied in existing literature, as P is computationally unbounded. We believe that the consequences of this most general form of correlations between provers has not been explored. We end this section with the following question, which, sadly, we are unable to answer: Question 1. Does there exist a ( V , P )-confined MIP which accepts a language not in NEXP?
Non-Local Resources via the Verifiers
The MIP = NEXP result is the combination of two works. First, [6] showed that MIP ⊆ NEXP. Second, [7] showed that MIP ⊇ NEXP. In this work, we began by describing how the second inclusion's proof of soundness overlooked a blind spot (correlational contamination). We then suggested a new, more restrictive model and presented a protocol for NEXP in this form, with the guarantee that the verifiers are now local. We believe that what the existing results really show is that "(∅, ∅)-confined MIPs accept NEXP."
We make the argument below that the full generality of local-prover MIPs has not been explored, and that it is still possible that MIP NEXP. We state upfront that, unfortunately, we do not have a specific example to back up our generic argument below.
So far in our discussion, verifier non-locality has been undesirable. This follows from the fact that verifier non-locality leads to prover non-locality, and the latter breaks many protocols. For example, [9] showed that certain MIPs for 3-SAT break down if the provers are entangled; [10] showed that certain multiprover commitment schemes are no longer binding if the provers have a CHSH box; more recently [21] showed that if the provers are allowed to sample arbitrary no-signaling distributions, then the set of languages accepted decreases to EXP.
However, properly utilized, we believe that verifier non-locality is a hitherto unused tool for protocol design. Consider this generic argument: Suppose that there exists T , a (∅, P )-confined MIP which accepts a language L / ∈ NEXP, and P is polynomial-time computable (T / ∈ MIP since the provers are not local). Then, we can construct a new ( V , ∅)-confined MIP T in which we run T , except V of T identical to P of T . When running T , whenever P is needed by the provers, they will ask the verifiers to compute it for them by calling V . If this series of miracles occurs, then MIP NEXP, because ( V , ∅)-confined MIPs are a subset of standard, single-verifier MIPs (and therefore T ∈ MIP). We agree that this may seem too many miracles to ask for, however they have not yet shown to be impossible.
We need to make clear that giving the provers a (polynomial-time) non-local task P is not the same as having the verifiers compute P for the provers by calling V . Giving the provers non-local resources means that malicious provers can exploit them in arbitrary ways. However, if we make the provers local, and let the verifiers provide the provers the same non-local resources, then malicious provers can no longer exploit them arbitrarily. For instance, the verifiers can control the timing and the amount of the non-local resources are used, as dictated by the protocol. If the provers deviate, then the verifiers abort. This is an example of how verifiers (and in the case of standard MIPs, the lone verifier) can enforce honest non-locality on the provers.
We leave as an open problem the following question:
Question 2. Does there exists a ( V , ∅)-confined MIP which accepts a language not in NEXP?
